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Corporatisation: Implementing Forest





New Zealand and the United States share a similar history of public
land management. In both countries, a forest service whose purpose was
to manage public forests according to principles of multiple use evolved
separately from a national park service. Both forest services nurtured a
fraternal cadre of foresters who, until recently, made management deci-
sions largely insulated from political or judicial pressure.
The past fifteen years have brought increased outside scrutiny to
bear on the New Zealand and United States forest services. The agencies
have been criticized from both economic and environmental perspec-
tives.' Observers have identified poor planning, hidden subsidies, and a
general lack of accountability as causes of wasteful spending and poor
resource management. In both New Zealand and the United States,
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some critics have proposed exposing national forest managers to market
incentives as a way to improve forest management and reduce costs. 2
New Zealand recently attempted implementing such a reform
through "corporatisation. ' ' 3 In this Article, we borrow the New Zealand
terms "corporatisation" and "corporatise" to refer to a reform in which a
state-owned company is vested with management authority over lands
formerly administered by a government agency. This Article examines
New Zealand public forest management and explores its similarities to
United States Forest Service (USFS) problems and corporatisation pro-
posals in the United States.
This Article does not address the question of whether market moti-
vations for economic efficiency are proper incentives for national forest
management. 4 Rather, it explores the problems of using a state-owned
corporation as a means of applying market incentives to forest manag-
ers.5 It is too early to pronounce a final verdict on the outcome of the
New Zealand experiment; however, a study of its implementation high-
lights some of the difficulties faced by proposed reforms in the United
States.
The most difficult issue facing public forest decisionmakers is how to
manage land that is valuable for both its natural features and its produc-
tive potential. In the United States, this tension in land use decisions is
played out in the conflicts over USFS forest plans.6 New Zealand's expe-
rience shows that public corporate management does not resolve land use
conflicts; it merely alters the form of the debate from a planning contro-
versy to a land allocation dispute.7
2. For critiques of the United States Forest Service (USFS) and related corporatisation
proposals, see R. O'TOOLE, REFORMING THE FOREST SERVICE (1988); O'Toole, Reforming
the Forest Service, 13 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 299, 309-15 (1988) (summarizing R. O'TOOLE,
supra); Teeguarden & Thomas, A Public Corporation Model for Federal Forest Land Manage-
ment, 25 NAT. RESOURCES J. 373 (1985). For a summary of the literature on federal or mixed
public-private corporate management of public lands, see Clawson, Major Alternatives for Fu-
ture Management of the Federal Lands, in RETHINKING THE FEDERAL LANDS 195, 214-18 (S.
Brubaker ed. 1984).
3. See infra notes 25-40 and accompanying text for a more detailed explanation of
corporatisation.
4. The application of private sector market incentives to federal lands has been debated
extensively. See generally M. CLAWSON, THE FEDERAL LANDS REVISITED 123-69 (1983); F.
STROUP & J. BADEN, NATURAL RESOURCES: BUREAUCRATIC MYTHS AND ENVIRONMEN-
TAL MANAGEMENT (1983); FORESTLANDS: PUBLIC AND PRIVATE (R. Deacon & M. Johnson
eds. 1985); RETHINKING THE FEDERAL LANDS, supra note 2; Hyde, The Federal Preserve in
the West, 2 J. POL'Y ANALYSIS & MGMT. 605 (1983); Krutilla, Fisher, Hyde, & Smith, Public
versus Private Ownership: The Federal Lands Case, 2 J. POL'Y ANALYSIS & MGMT. 548
(1983); An Exchange on "Privatization, " J. CONTEMP. STUD., Spr. 1984, at 5.
5. See, e.g., Teeguarden & Thomas, supra note 2, at 385 (raising this distinction in a
proposal to separate the "usual objections to using economic efficiency criteria as a basis for
public land management [from the] shortcomings of the specific proposal.").
6. See infra notes 8-21 and accompanying text.
7. See infra notes 119-44 and accompanying text.
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Part I of this Article reviews some of the current criticism of USFS
planning and proposed reforms that would force USFS to employ market
incentives. Part II describes forest management in New Zealand before
corporatisation and notes its similarities to current practice in the United
States. Part III explores New Zealand's implementation of corporatisa-
tion. Finally, Part IV analyzes some of the problems New Zealand has
encountered in its reforms and outlines what we in the United States can
learn from that experience. The New Zealand experience exposes impor-
tant issues that current U.S. corporatisation proposals neglect.
I
NATIONAL FOREST MANAGEMENT IN THE UNITED STATES:
CRITICISMS AND PROPOSED REFORMS
USFS manages its lands according to the principle of multiple use. 8
Multiple use management requires tradeoffs between the various goods a
forest produces to maximize "long term net public benefits in an environ-
mentally sound manner." 9 Conflicts between incompatible uses, such as
logging and wilderness recreation, are managed through forest planning.
Two acts govern national forest planning in the United States: the
Forest and Rangelands Renewable Resources Planning Act of 1974
(RPA),'0 and the National Forest Management Act of 1976 (NFMA)."1
These Acts create a forest planning process under which USFS must as-
sess the renewable resources on its lands every ten years, propose long-
range strategic objectives for its activities every five years, and evaluate
its progress toward these objectives every year. 12 In addition to this
broad-scale planning effort under the RPA, the staff of each national for-
est must develop a plan setting forth the objectives, uses, and milestones
for specific land areas and resources.1 3 After receiving comments on a
8. The Multiple-Use-Sustained-Yield Act of 1960, 16 U.S.C. §§ 528-532 (1982 & Supp.
IV 1986), endorsed outdoor recreation, range, timber, watershed, and wildlife and fish pur-
poses as proper uses of the national forests, but the multiple use principle has guided USFS
since 1905. Clawson, The Concept of Multiple Use Forestry, 8 ENVTL. L. 281, 282 (1978). See
generally H. KAUFMAN, THE FOREST RANGER (1960) (discussing the administrative behavior
of USFS and identifying problems and incentives inherent in the institutional structure); Wil-
kinson, The Forest Service: A Call for a Return to First Principles, 5 PUB. LAND L. REV. 1
(1984) (tracing the development of USFS policies and traditions such as its general indepen-
dence and its domination by foresters).
9. 36 C.F.R.,§ 219.1(a) (1988). Multiple use gives consideration to "the relative values
of the various resources, and not necessarily the combination of uses that will give the greatest
dollar return or the greatest unit output." Id. § 219.3. "[S]ome lands will be used for less thani
all of the resources." Id.
10. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1600-1610 (1982), as amended by the National Forest Management Act
of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-588, 90 Stat. 2949 (1976).
11. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1600-1614 (1982).
12. The ten-year assessment under the RPA is required by id. § 1601, the five-year objec-
tives are required by id. § 1602, and the annual evaluation is required by id. § 1606.
13. The procedures and required elements of national forest plans are set forth at 36
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draft forest plan, the local staff issues a final plan, which is then subject to
administrative appeals and possibly judicial review. 14 Together, these
statutes and the regulations promulgated under them provide an oppor-
tunity for interest groups to participate in the formulation of individual
national forest plans: Of the ninety-two final forest plans issued as of
February 1989, eighty-nine had been appealed. 15
A. Criticisms
Critics argue that national forest planning is not working. Public
participation is difficult without a technical understanding of the basic
assumptions and judgments hidden in the systems analysis underlying
the planning process.' 6 USFS's investment (in both dollars and person-
hours) in the forest planning process is enormous and growing.17 In spite
of this effort, USFS continues timber sales that are not rational from a
social, economic, or environmental perspective. 18 The essence of USFS's
planning problem is that shifting political norms make it exceedingly dif-
ficult to reconcile the inherent conflicts between competing forest uses.
Like any government agency interested in maintaining and ex-
panding its programs, USFS must choose between either spending all
allocated funds even if its objectives could be achieved more cheaply, or
risking a reduction in funding. This tradeoff, combined with numerous
incentives and subsidies that favor logging over other forest uses, has led
to further criticism of USFS. The Knutson-Vandenberg Act of 1930,19
for instance, rewards managers who sell timber by allowing them to keep
an unlimited share of the timber receipts to pay for reforestation and
other activities that otherwise might not be funded.
C.F.R. §§ 219.1-219.29 (1988).
14. Id. § 219.10(b). For a comprehensive analysis of forest planning, see Wilkinson &
Anderson, Land and Resource Planning in the National Forests, 64 OR. L. REV. 1 (1985).
15. American Forestry Association, Resource Hotline 3 (Feb. 7, 1989) (newsletter).
16. See R. O'TOOLE, supra note 2, at 54-69; Allen & Gould, Complexity, Wickedness, and
Public Forests, J. FORESTRY, Apr. 1986, at 20. For instance, USFS implements the planning
procedures by using complex computer programs such as FORPLAN, which create confusing
technical documents that are often indecipherable to the layperson. R. O'TOOLE, supra note 2,
at 178. See generally LeMaster, On Expanding the Supply of Forest Resources from Federal
Forest Lands, in REDIRECTING THE RPA (Yale School of Forestry & Environmental Studies
Bull. 95, 1988).
17. R. O'TOOLE, supra note 2, at 176-77; see Behan, RPA/NFMA-Time to Punt, J. FOR-
ES'RY, Dec. 1981, at 802, 804 (noting the "exponentially rising costs" of attempting to make
the forest plans "legally invincible").
18. R. O'TOOLE, supra note 2, at 97-157; Clawson, The National Forests, 191 SCIENCE
762 (1976) (recommending new procedures and analyses to test economic rationality); V. Sam-
ple, Below-Cost Timber Sales on the National Forests (July 1984) (issue brief for The Wilder-
ness Society). For additional critiques of forest planning, see Applegate, The Multiple Use
Planning Process: Descent into the Maelstrom? 8 ENVTL. L. 427 (1978); Krutilla and Haigh,
An Integrated Approach to National Forest Management, 8 ENVTL. L. 373 (1978).
19. 16 U.S.C. § 576-576b (1982).
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At the same time, managers can collect recreation fees only for de-
veloped recreation, such as campgrounds with toilets and garbage collec-
tion.20 One effect of these budgetary incentives is that the recreation
industry is not considered a potential promoter of another important na-
tional forest objective--community stability. Instead, agency planners
promote community stability almost exclusively through the timber in-
dustry and use this rationale to justify some below-cost timber sales. 21
B. Proposed Reforms
Proposals to improve forest management range from reforming
USFS22 to selling the national forests themselves. 23 These proposals can
be categorized according to whether they include government or private
ownership and management of forest lands. USFS reform proposals
would retain government ownership and management of the national for-
ests. Privatization proposals would relinquish both ownership and man-
agement to the private sector. A hybrid third option is corporatisation,
in which the government transfers resource management authority to a
corporate entity or entities, but retains ownership by holding stock in the
corporation or by keeping title to the land. 24 New Zealand currently is
implementing this hybrid approach.
20. R. O'TOOLE, supra note 2, at 168-69. Furthermore, the fees collected for developed
recreation do not augment the forest manager's budget; they are invested in the Land and
Water Conservation Fund. Id.
21. Id. at 90-92.
22. Richard Alston agrees with O'Toole's call to collect user fees, but rejects market-
driven management of USFS. Alston, Book Review, 15 ECOLOGY L. Q. 503 (1988) (reviewing
R. O'TOOLE, supra note 2). McQuillan suggests charging full market value for recreation and
prohibiting timber sales unless revenues from the sales exceed costs. McQuillan, The Forest
Planning Nightmare, 14 W. WILDLANDS 34 (1988). Behan proposes the repeal of RPA and
NFMA so that management can proceed according to "solid, professional, experienced judge-
ment" without the possibility of invasive judicial review. Behan, supra note 17, at 802-03.
A number of other suggestions for introducing market mechanisms into public forest
management are found in: M. CLAWSON, supra note 4, at 171-229; Clawson, supra note 2, at
195-234; Hyde, Demand-Side Management in REDIRECTING THE RPA (Yale School of For-
estry & Environmental Studies Bull. 95, 1988); Nelson, Improving Market Mechanisms in U.S.
Forestry in REDIRECTING THE RPA, supra. These suggestions include large-scale, long-term
leasing of forest lands. For instance, Porterie, Gartley, and Horton suggest long-term forest
regeneration contracts for national forest management. Porterie, Gartley, & Horton, Steward-
ship Contracts, J. FORESTRY, Nov. 1986, at 29. By contrast, Clawson proposes a "pull-back"
provision for land sales and leases under which a competing user could apply for part of the
land to be "pulled back" from another user's purchase or lease application. M. CLAWSON,
supra note 4, at 216-24.
23. R. STROUP & J. BADEN, supra note 4, at 123-26; Gardner, The Case for Divestiture, in
RETHINKING THE FEDERAL LANDS, supra note 2; Hanke, Privatize the National Forests, Wall
St. J., Aug. 23, 1988, at 26, col. 3. Transferring forest ownership to private entities is discussed
in M. CLAWSON, supra note 4, at 189-95; Clawson, supra note 2, at 210-14. See generally An
Exchange on "Privatization, " supra note 4.
24. Teeguarden & Thomas, supra note 2, at 375-76.
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Recently, corporatisation has been suggested by Randal O'Toole, as
well as by Dennis Teeguarden and David Thomas, as a solution to the
problems with USFS. 25 Corporatisation is viewed as a way to increase
the accountability of forest managers by subjecting them to the con-
straints and incentives of the market. Under corporatisation, each na-
tional forest would "be chartered to operate as a wholly governmentally-
owned autonomous corporation with a board of directors and adminis-
trative officers. '2 6 O'Toole suggests that state governors and the Secre-
tary of Agriculture appoint directors to each corporation to insure its
public accountability. 27 Teeguarden and Thomas favor a national Public
Corporations Board to regulate the performance of individual forest
corporations.28
Under corporatisation, the discipline of the market would alleviate
the need for the complex cost-benefit planning mandated by RPA and
NFMA. 29 The market approach to management would also remove
now-hidden subsidies and appropriations that currently support uneco-
nomic practices of USFS. National forest programs and uses would be
forced to pay their own way. If the federal (or even local) government
wanted a forest to fulfill a social function, such as community stability, it
would have to contract explicitly with the particular forest corporation
and thus reveal the true program price.30
25. R. O'TOOLE, supra note 2, at 215; Teeguarden & Thomas, supra note 2, at 374pas-
sim. Earlier specific proposals for transferring forest management to public corporations are
described by M. CLAWSON, supra note 4, at 195-200; Clawson, supra note 2, at 214; and
Nelson, Ideology and Public Land Policy, in RETHINKING THE FEDERAL LANDS, supra note 2,
at 275, 291-92. Two proposals for corporatisation similar to the ones described in the text do
not fit squarely in the state-owned model. Robert H. Nelson proposes creating corporations
for the federal government's prime timber lands. Although stock in the corporations initially
would be held by local counties and the federal government, the federal government's stock
would gradually be sold to private owners over a transition period. Nelson, Making Sense of
the Sagebrush Rebellion: A Long Term Strategy for the Public Lands 41 (Oct. 1981) (paper
presented at the Third-Annual Conference of the Association for Public Policy Analysis and
Management, Washington, D.C.). In 1957, Marion Clawson and Burnell Held proposed a
single public corporation that would be charged with managing all federal lands. However,
Clawson and Held were concerned that a public lands corporation would become too commer-
cial in its management style. M. CLAWSON & B. HELD, THE FEDERAL LANDS: THEIR USE
AND MANAGEMENT 347-62 (1957).
26. Teeguarden & Thomas, supra note 2, at 374.
27. R. O'TOOLE, supra note 2, at 215. O'Toole, though, believes that the market method
of financing has a stronger influence on an organization than the composition of its board of
directors. Id. at 107-09.
28. Teeguarden & Thomas, supra note 2, at 375. Teeguarden and Thomas do not discuss
details, such as the instruments of regulation or the Board's enforcement authority.
29. See Behan, supra note 17, at 804. Behan observes that large industrial forests are
managed in a constrained, pragmatic, and cost-effective manner, even though they are not
required to abide by the detailed planning requirements of RPA/NFMA. Id.
30. See Teeguarden & Thomas, supra note 2, at 375, 381-82. Teeguarden and Thomas do
not specify which goods would be purchased by the government and which would be obtained
through regulation.
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By vesting management authority in each individual forest corpora-
tion, planning would be decentralized. Private sector management
would be able to reward success more effectively than government man-
agement, and local decisionmakers would be more accountable for the
risks they take. The responsiveness of forest corporations to local envi-
ronmental constraints and economic priorities would also improve be-
cause managers would not be subject to national quotas or directives.3 1
The regional and national levels of USFS's hierarchy would not be dupli-
cated in the forest corporations. O'Toole suggests that the only role for a
regional or national forestry body would be to provide support services
such as research. 32 In fact, O'Toole regards the Teeguarden and Thomas
proposal for a national Public Corporations Board with regulatory au-
thority as a threat to the creative diversity of decisions made by autono-
mous forest corporations. 33
O'Toole and Teeguarden and Thomas believe that recreation pro-
viders respond to the public's demand for recreation opportunities. 34
Therefore, their proposals for the United States would place nonwilder-
ness areas that are used primarily for recreation in the control of forest
corporations. 35 However, they also assert that the National Wilderness
Preservation System should not be subject to profit maximization. 36 Pro-
posals for managing wilderness areas under corporatisation include cre-
ating wilderness trusts, leasing areas to private environmental groups,
transferring lands to the National Park Service, and permitting the forest
corporations to administer the areas pursuant to the Wilderness Act.37
31. See id. at 384-85.
32. R. O'TOOLE, supra note 2, at 215, 228.
33. Id. at 219.
34. Id. at 204-06. O'Toole maintains that recreation fees will increase recreation oppor-
tunities. Id. at 206. Teeguarden and Thomas foresee the provision of outdoor recreation by
national forests in order to improve public relations and to avoid the costs of preventing recre-
ation. Teeguarden & Thomas, supra note 2, at 381. Whether profit-maximizing corporations
can actually provide an appropriate level of recreation is a question beyond the scope of this
Article. See generally sources cited supra note 4. A major focus of the debate over forest
management is whether the market is responsive to biological diversity and other nonpriced
resources. This, too, is beyond the scope of this Article. Here, we only focus on the feasibility
of implementing corporatisation, not the adequacy of the goods it provides.
35. This differs somewhat from the New Zealand situation in which most land used pri-
marily for recreation was placed in the control of a government conservation agency. See infra
text accompanying notes 105-18. The allocation process used to divide land between wilder-
ness and commercial managers would be substantially more contentious in the United States
where the mix of uses on forest land is more diverse than in New Zealand. See infra text
accompanying notes 171-73.
36. The National Wilderness Preservation System was created by the Wilderness Act of
1964, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1131-1136 (1982). See J. KRUTILLA & A. FISHER, THE ECONOMICS OF
NATURAL ENVIRONMENTS 14-15 (1975) (arguing that markets do not properly value
wilderness).
37. R. O'TOOLE, supra note 2, at 216; Teeguarden & Thomas, supra note 2, at 381. See
generally Baden, Free Markets Can Protect the Earth, High Country News, Feb. 27, 1989, at
13 (describing a similar private sector approach to national park management).
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Teeguarden and Thomas recommend testing their model by
"corporatising" a portion of the national forest system. 38 O'Toole is
wary of this sort of test because recreationists in the test region could
travel elsewhere to avoid user fees.39 However, even if one of the models
were tested nationwide, users could still avoid fees by using state or local
parks and forests that would remain free. In any event, a test of
corporatisation is already in progress in New Zealand. It behooves us to
learn from the New Zealand experience before considering implementa-
tion of such reforms in the United States.4°
II
PUBLIC FOREST MANAGEMENT IN NEW ZEALAND
A. The Physical Setting
New Zealand is a nation of more than three million people on two
mountainous islands with an area of just over 100,000 square miles
(about the size of Colorado).4 1 In pre-Polynesian times, 78% of the is-
lands' area was forest. 42 Polynesian settlement by the Maori people, be-
ginning about 1000 years ago, and European settlement, beginning about
150 years ago, have resulted in clearing to the extent that only 27% of
the country remains forested.43
European settlers viewed the impenetrable indigenous forest as an
obstacle and cut it to provide fuel and grazing lands. 44 In the early
1900's the government, as a conservation measure, established exotic
plantation forests. 45 The pace of planting boomed in the late 1920's and
early 1930's, providing employment and responding to projected timber
shortages. In the 1960's, planting increased again with the aim of doub-
ling the area of exotic forests by the end of the century.46 Although they
38. Teeguarden & Thomas, supra note 2, at 386-87.
39. R. O'TOOLE, supra note 2, at 220.
40. The New Zealand reform has been described by White, New Zealand Forestry.- Priva-
tization Gets a Test, J. FORESTRY, Mar. 1987, at 41; Wolf, Government Corporations, J. FOR-
ESTRY, Dec. 1987, at 14; M. Clawson, Public Forests in New Zealand and in the United States
(Resources for the Future, Discussion Paper No. RR88-01, 1988).
41. BUREAU OF PUB. AFFAIRS, U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, BACKGROUND NOTES: NEW
ZEALAND I (Mar. 1987).
42. 20 ENCYCLOPEDIA AMERICANA 255 (1961).
43. NEW ZEALAND DEPARTMENT OF STATISTICS, 91 OFFICIAL YEARBOOK 403 (1986-
87) [hereinafter 91 OFFICIAL YEARBOOK]. See generally H. FLEET, NEW ZEALAND'S FOR-
ESTS 1-20 (1984). By way of comparison, in the United States 32% of the land is forest. THE
CONSERVATION FOUNDATION, STATE OF THE ENVIRONMENT: A VIEW TOWARD THE
NINETIES 218 (1987).
44. H. FLEET, supra note 43, at 95-110.
45. Id. at 96-100. An exotic plantation is a stand of trees that is not native to an area and
is planted following a clearcut. The first state plantation was established in 1896. NEW ZEA-
LAND DEPARTMENT OF STATISTICS, 93 OFFICIAL YEARBOOK 555 (1988) [hereinafter 93 OF-
FICIAL YEARBOOK].
46. The annual rate of new planting increased in the 1970's and has averaged 20,000
[Vol. 16:719









0 State Indigenous Forest
0 State Exotic Forest
I* Private Exotic Forest
This map illustrates the areas involved in public forest corporatisation. National Parks,
formerly managed by the Department of Lands and Survey, were allocated to the De-
partment of Conservation. State Exotic Forests, formerly managed by the New Zealand
Forest Service, were allocated to Forestry Corporation. The allocation of State Indige-
nous Forests, formerly managed by the New Zealand Forest Service, created tremen-
dous political and technical problems because both the Department of Conservation and
the Forestry Corporation wanted to manage many of the native forest stands. Ultimately,
the Department of Conservation received the vast majority of the State Indigenous
Forest lands.
Reprinted by permission of Holmes & Meier.
Source: New Zealand in Maps 97 (A.G. Anderson, ed. 1977).
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compose only 17% of the total forest area in New Zealand, exotic planta-
tions now account for over 90% of timber harvests. 47 The remaining
indigenous forests4 8 continue to be under pressure for use by both the
forestry49 and pastoral industries. In addition, environmental concerns
have now become an important part of the public land policy debate. 50
The New Zealand Government owns about 50% of the total area of
the country. 5' Approximately one-twelfth of the land area of the nation
is set aside as parks and reserves. 52 The state plantation forests, which
account for half of all plantation forests in New Zealand,5 3 have been
planted with fast-growing, exotic conifers, such as radiata pine, Pinus
radiata. These trees reach sawlog size after twenty-five to thirty years.
The indigenous state forests are composed of slower-growing species,
such as the rimu, Dacrydium cupressinum.54
B. The Agencies
Before 1987, when New Zealand transferred the management of its
public forests to several new entities as part of the corporatisation experi-
ment, the two main agencies responsible for forest management were the
New Zealand Forest Service (NZFS) and the Department of Lands and
Survey. NZFS was established in 1919 under the direction of Leon Mc-
Intosh Ellis, a Canadian forester who practiced conservation forestry in
the same tradition as Gifford Pinchot. Like Pinchot, who shaped the
hectares per year since 1974. NEW ZEALAND DEPARTMENT OF STATISTICS, 92 OFFICIAL
YEARBOOK 447 (1987-88) [her'einafter 92 OFFICIAL YEARBOOK]. Recent changes in the New
Zealand economic climate (including corporatisation) may lower the rate of planting.
47. NEW ZEALAND TREASURY, ECONOMIC MANAGEMENT-LAND USE ISSUES 30
(1984). For descriptions of exotic forestry, see White, supra note 40, at 41-42; Wolf, supra note
40, at 14-15.
48. Indigenous forests compose 86% of the total forest area in New Zealand (the balance
is exotic). Over 80% of these natural stands are state-owned. 92 OFFICIAL YEARBOOK, supra
note 46, at 395.
49. The New Zealand timber industry contributes a little over 1% of the New Zealand
GNP and accounts for about 13.8% of the value of exports. 91 OFFICIAL YEARBOOK, supra
note 43, at 797, 801; NEW ZEALAND DEPARTMENT OF STATISTICS, NEW ZEALAND - 1987
(1987).
50. T. Buhrs, Environmental Policy Development: The Case of New Zealand 4 (1987)
(unpublished paper delivered at the Australian Political Studies Conference, Aug. 25-28, Uni-
versity of Auckland).
51. 91 OFFICIAL YEARBOOK, supra note 43, at 412. The United States Government owns
about one-third of the nation's land. THE CONSERVATION FOUNDATION, supra note 43, at
196.
52. 91 OFFICIAL YEARBOOK, supra note 43, at 416.
53. Id. at 474. USFS, by comparison, manages 18% of the nation's commercial forest
land and 51% of the softwood sawtimber inventory in the United States. Dowdle & Hanke,
Public Timber Policy and the Wood-Products Industry, in FORESTLANDS: PUBLIC AND PRI-
VATE 77, 79-81 (R. Deacon & M. Johnson eds. 1985).
54. See H. FLEET, supra note 43, at 6-10, for a description of indigenous forests.
NEW ZEALAND FOREST MANAGEMENT
character of USFS, Ellis left an indelible mark on the character of
NZFS.55
NZFS was organized in three levels: a head office in Wellington,
where the Director General approved all major policies and plans; con-
servancies, which oversaw different regions of the country; and districts,
which ran field operations. State forests were managed exclusively by
NZFS, which was charged to give due regard to sound forestry practices,
public use, and socioeconomic welfare on both a. regional and national
basis.5 6 These forests contained three types of areas: exotic plantations
devoted entirely to timber production, multiple use forest parks, and in-
digenous preservation reserves.
Almost all New Zealand foresters were trained in NZFS. By contin-
ually rotating its personnel through forests around the country, the ser-
vice fostered an esprit de corps among its professionals. 57 In large part,
this included subscribing to the creed of technically sound multiple use
management. Similarly, USFS is also known for its use of frequent trans-
fers to foster institutional camaraderie.58
The Department of Lands and Survey also played an important for-
est management role as the steward of New Zealand's national parks. In
addition, the department administered high-country pastoral leases.5 9
Like NZFS, the Department of Lands and Survey had a mandate that
was part preservation (park protection) and part production (farming
and grazing). 6°
C. Criticisms of Forest Management
As in the United States, the environmental and fiscal shortcomings
of public forest management in New Zealand began to surface in the late
1960's and 1970's. Environmentalists complained that multiple use was
mere rhetoric, used by NZFS foresters who were really only interested in
timber production. Most controversial were NZFS programs to log in-
digenous tree species.6' Despite attempts to give environmentalists ac-
55. Id. at 113 (describing Ellis's influence on the management and administration per-
formed by NZFS).
56. 91 OFFICIAL YEARBOOK, supra note 43, at 421.
57. Growing Up, 30 NEW ZEALAND J. FORESTRY 171, 172 (1985); Clawson, supra note
40, at 15.
58. See M. Clawson, supra note 40, at 14-16 (discussing the similarities between NZFS
and USFS); see also Growing Up, supra note 57, at 171. On USFS, see generally Wilkinson,
supra note 8.
59. Land Act of 1948, N.Z. Stat. 64, §§ 3, 106-110.
60. See National Parks Act of 1980, N.Z. Stat. 66; Reserves Act of 1977, N.Z. Stat. 66.
61. See H. FLEET, supra note 43, at 147 (describing the clearcutting of areas of virgin
forests over substantial environmental objections); A. Lees, The Forest Service: Its Environ-
mental Record 2-8 (n.d.) (available from the Maruia Society, Nelson, New Zealand) (describ-
ing the poor to nonexistent implementation of the Indigenous Forest Policy by NZFS).
1989]
ECOLOGY LAW QUARTERLY
cess to the long-insulated NZFS institutional culture, environmentalists
still felt excluded from forest management decisions.
62
In New Zealand, where the judiciary is more deferential to govern-
ment decisions than in the United States, environmentalists are far less
likely than their American counterparts might be under similar circum-
stances to challenge a management plan in court.63 By the 1980's, there
was a growing sense among environmentalists that NZFS could not be
relied on to protect indigenous forests as long as it was also charged with
commercial production and job creation. 64 The 1986-87 budget for
NZFS allocated 4.3% of its funding for state forest protection, compared
with 76.7% for sawmilling and production forest management. 65
Fiscal conservatives and officials in the New Zealand Treasury were
also unhappy with the performance of NZFS.66 Although there is some
doubt whether the production arm of NZFS ever broke even, 67 NZFS as
a whole ran large annual deficits: growing from $(N.Z.)92 million in
1980-81 to $(N.Z.)211 million in 1984-85.68 Management of public for-
62. In 1976, a new policy required NZFS to consider public comments on management
plans. N.Z. Stat. 45 (1976); see also Kirkland, The Rise and Fall of Multiple-Use Forest Man-
agement in New Zealand, N.Z. FORESTRY, May 1988, at 9 (discussing the need for administra-
tive accountability in the allocation of "forest-based" benefits). However, no plans were ever
changed after public comment. See also Salmon, Balance, in 1986 DEBATE SERIES-ENVI-
RONMENT MEETS ECONOMICS 29-30 (Environmental Council & Ministry for the Environ-
ment eds. 1986) (describing the lack of public input in forest management decisions); Wylie,
Public Accountability, in 1986 DEBATE SERIES-ENVIRONMENT MEETS ECONOMICS 44 (En-
vironmental Council & Ministry for the Environment eds. 1986) (analyzing the lack of ac-
countability of NZFS to legitimate public concerns about management programs); Native
Forests Action Council, Submission on Environmental Administration in New Zealand 3-4
(Feb. 28, 1985) (submission to the State Services Commission discussing the numerous scientif-
ically based objections to forest plans that were ignored by NZFS).
63. New Zealand society is more homogeneous and less litigious than that of the United
States. Also, the parliamentary system in New Zealand vests tremendous power in the govern-
ment, which not only controls lawmaking in the House of Representatives (Parliament), but
also implements laws through departments and ministries.
64. See the discussion of NZFS employment schemes in H. FLEET, supra note 43, at 114
(noting that radiata pine was planted in depressed areas to boost regional employment) and P.
McKINLAY, CORPORATISATION: THE SOLUTION FOR STATE OWNED ENTERPRISE? 70
(1987) (discussing the NZFS policy of basing planting decisions on employment conditions
rather than on the physical suitability of lands for timber or the costs of planting and harvest-
ing timber). The former NZFS Director General, Andy Kirkland (now Managing Director of
the New Zealand Forestry Corporation (Forestry Corporation)), noted that NZFS "was
charged with reconciling Government objectives of three types-commercial, social, and envi-
ronmental." Kirkland, supra note 62, at 9.
65. NEW ZEALAND, COMMENTARY ON THE ESTIMATES OF THE EXPENDITURE OF THE
GOVERNMENT OF NEW ZEALAND FOR THE YEAR ENDING 31 MARCH 1987, at 39 (1986).
66. NEW ZEALAND TREASURY, ECONOMIC MANAGEMENT-LAND USE ISSUES 35-38
(1984).
67. See P. GRANT, THE STRUCTURE OF THE FOREST SERVICE AND ITS ECONOMIC PER-
FORMANCE (1985) (published by the Native Forests Action Council, Nelson, N.Z.). Grant
estimates that the production forestry operations lost $(N.Z.)2.255 billion from 1980-84,
although different accounting techniques would show a modest surplus. Id. at 12, 47.
68. 91 OFFICIAL YEARBOOK, supra note 43, at 423 (the deficits cited include only money
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ests was attacked as inefficient because of both the overstaffing of NZFS
and the overlapping responsibilities between NZFS and the Department
of Lands and Survey.69 Finally, critics charged that the true costs of
social programs, such as job creation schemes and flood control projects,
were hidden in the NZFS budgets as costs associated with planting
programs.70
By the time the current Labour Government came to power in 1984,
concerns about the total government deficit were grave. Uneconomic,
government-sponsored projects were putting a tremendous strain on the
New Zealand economy. 7' The Labour Government sought to cut costs
and eliminate subsidies in a number of areas as well as to remove the
government from the commercial sector where it was not receiving a
competitive rate of return from its investments.7 2 Thus, while they had
differing reasons for their beliefs, both economists and environmentalists
spent on establishing and tending state forests, not general administrative costs). The deficit
reported for the final year of NZFS (1986-87) was $(N.Z.)165 million. NEW ZEALAND, COM-
MENTARY ON THE ESTIMATES OF THE EXPENDITURE OF THE GOVERNMENT OF NEW ZEA-
LAND FOR THE YEAR ENDING 31 MARCH 1988, at 54 (1987) [hereinafter ESTIMATES 1988].
The value of the New Zealand dollar has varied from approximately 50% to 99% of the value
of the U.S. dollar over the past few years. Compare Wall St. J., Jan. 2, 1986, at 25 ($(N.Z.)
1.00 equal to $(U.S.) 0.5000) with Wall St. J., Jan. 2, 1980, at 22 ($(N.Z.) 1.00 equal to $(U.S).
0.9875).
69. NEW ZEALAND DEPARTMENT OF LANDS AND SURVEY & THE NEW ZEALAND
FOREST SERVICE, PRELIMINARY REPORT ON THE PROPOSED MERGER OF THE DEPART-
MENT OF LANDS AND THE NEW ZEALAND FOREST SERVICE 2 (1982) (aims of the proposed
merger included removing duplicate staff and facilities to gain "consequent economies").
70. The true cost of social goods provided by public forest planting is not simply the
materials and salary for the planting, but also the opportunity cost of using the land subse-
quently committed to plantation forestry. NEW ZEALAND TREASURY, supra note 66, at 34-
35; see also P. MCKINLAY, supra note 64, at 69-70 (discussing, by analogy to the effect of
corporatisation on the New Zealand Postal Service, the ways in which government evaluations
of the costs of forestry projects undertaken purely for social reasons might change with
corporatisation). In the East Coast region, NZFS planted trees on steep, eroded mountain
headlands to protect farms and coastal towns from flooding and siltation. The trees were
effective protection during cyclone Bola in March 1988. Now that corporatisation is being
implemented, the Government is figuring the true costs of the protection planting program.
Smith, Tapsell Lends Hand to East Coast, NAT'L Bus. REV. [New Zealand], May 11, 1988. If
the Government decides to proceed with the project, it will openly contract with a company to
provide protection programs. See State-Owned Enterprises Act of 1986, N.Z. Stat. 124, § 7
(authorizing the government to contract with state-owned enterprises for noncommercial
activities).
71. See R. DOUGLAS & L. CALLEN, TOWARDS PROSPERITY (1987) (documenting La-
bour's economic program beginning with its election in 1984); Palmer, Directions for State
Enterprise, in PURPOSE, PERFORMANCE, AND PROFIT-REDEFINING THE PUBLIC SECTOR
25-29 (M. Clark & E. Sinclair eds. 1986) (documenting the poor rate of return on public
commercial enterprises); Address by Roger 0. Douglas to the Asia Society, in New York City,
Sept. 4, 1986 (entitled "New Zealand: An Economy in Transition").
72. In addition to the forestry and land corporations discussed below, the Labour Gov-
ernment created commercial enterprises to manage state interests in coal, electricity, govern-
ment buildings, the Post Office, the Post Office Bank, and the telephone system. See New
Zealand Maori Council v. Attorney General, I N.Z.L.R. 641 (C.A. 1987). See generally P.
McKINLAY, supra note 64, at 63-73.
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became convinced that indigenous forest conservation needed to be di-
vorced from commercial forestry, and as a result, NZFS became one of
the first targets of reform. 73
III
THE NEW ZEALAND REFORM: CORPORATISATION
In response to the environmental and economic criticism of NZFS,
the New Zealand Government "corporatised" production forestry by
creating the New Zealand Forestry Corporation (Forestry Corpora-
tion).74  Preservation functions, such as the stewardship of national
parks, were given to a newly created Department of Conservation. 75 A
new Ministry of Forestry conducts other former NZFS activities, such as
research. Reform through corporatisation is by no means complete. Is-
sues such as the public accountability of state-owned enterprises, the val-
uation of lands and resources transferred to such entities, and the
allocation of lands between production and preservation uses are not yet
resolved.
A. Forestry Corporation
The New Zealand Forestry Corporation began business as a state-
owned enterprise (SOE) on April 1, 1987. All the SOE's operate under a
statutory charter to:
operate a successful business, and, to this end, to be - (a) As profitable
and efficient as comparable businesses that are not owned by the Crown;
and (b) A good employer; and (c) An organisation that exhibits a sense of
social responsibility by having regard to the interests of the community in
which it operates. 76
Although the SOE's charter appears to accommodate the tradition
of multiple use forest management, "[t]he principal objective of the New
Zealand Forestry Corporation is to operate as a successful forestry and
wood processing business. 77 With these general statutory mandates and
73. In 1985, the Environment Forum brought together environmentalists who reached a
consensus that the production and preservation objectives of NZFS and the Department of
Lands and Survey should be separated. Preservation functions of both agencies were to be
combined in a government agency, not a state-owned corporation.
74. R. DOUGLAS & L. CALLEN, supra note 71, at 252.
75. Conservation Act of 1987, N.Z. Stat. 65.
76. State-Owned Enterprises Act of 1986, N.Z. Stat. 124, § 4; see also State-Owned En-
terprises Amendment Act of 1987, N.Z. Stat. 117. This charter also applies to the New Zea-
land Land Corporation (Land Corp.), which manages the public pastoral estate. State-Owned
Enterprises Act of 1986, N.Z. Stat. 124, first schedule.
77. NEW ZEALAND FORESTRY CORP., STATEMENT OF CORPORATE INTENT (n.d.) (cov-
ering the years 1987-88 to 1989-90); see also N.Z. FORESTRY CORP., 1988 ANN. REP. 5 (af-
firming the principal objective of business success as measured by profitability and efficiency).
Forestry Corporation places a "strong emphasis on effective utilisation of its resources, on
marketing and sales, and on customer satisfaction." NEW ZEALAND FORESTRY CORP., AN
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little guidance from shareholding ministers, the officers of Forestry Cor-
poration had to define the company's specific financial goals based on.an
evaluation of the available resources. Because of the use of different ac-
counting methods by NZFS and Forestry Corporation, and the existence
of cross-subsidies in NZFS, it is almost impossible to say whether For-
estry Corporation is more efficient than NZFS. However, Forestry Cor-
poration, comparing its first year of operation with NZFS's last year of
production, estimates a turnaround of $(N.Z.)100 million. According to
Forestry Corporation, these savings are attributable to a reduction of
overhead, staffing, and general operations. 78
One of the reasons Forestry Corporation is able to operate with
fewer employees is that it employs independent contractors for most of
its needs. The organizational structure of Forestry Corporation was cre-
ated by a panel of leading New Zealand business people, who designed it
to be streamlined and lean. 79 As the top positions in the corporation
were filled, the new executives hand-picked the best of the former NZFS
employees to work for Forestry Corporation. The new organization is
designed to produce timber with less red tape, better communication,
and more flexibility. Where NZFS employed mechanics, carpenters,
electricians, and loggers, Forestry Corporation bargains with indepen-
dent contractors when such services are needed and therefore is able to
operate with fewer institutional employees.
Some former NZFS employees took advantage of this opportunity
by forming small independent contracting businesses and purchasing or
leasing old NZFS equipment. The only corporate employee Forestry
Corporation will have in the field during a timber harvest is a representa-
tive to monitor an independent logging gang's performance. While these
reforms, abandoning uneconomic indigenous timber harvests, logging
with smaller gangs, and reducing pruning, planting, and thinning opera-
tions, have increased the profitability of public forest management,
corporatisation has also displaced workers and contributed to unemploy-
ment in the timber industry. 80
A complaint made by many of the parties that deal with Forestry
Corporation is that some former NZFS employees now working for the
INTRODUCTION TO THE NEW CORPORATION: INVITATION FOR MANAGEMENT POSITIONS 1
(1987).
78. N.Z. FORESTRY CORP., 1988 ANN. REP. 6; Kirkland, Corporation with Another View-
point, N.Z. FOREST INDUSTRIES, Aug. 1988, at 8 (letter to the editor).
79. The Establishment Board for Forestry Corporation made a number of recommenda-
tions regarding the functioning of the SOE that were ultimately accepted by the Government.
NEW ZEALAND FORESTRY CORPORATION ESTABLISHMENT BOARD, REPORT OF ESTABLISH-
MENT BOARD OF THE PROPOSED NEW FORESTRY CORPORATION (1986).
80. Total unemployment has risen to 9.4% from 4.9% since the Labour Government
came to power in 1984. McGurn, New Zealand's Painful Economic Cure, Wall St. J., Oct. 11,
1988, at 22, col. 3. Many small communities that relied heavily on forestry for jobs are strug-
gling with pressing social problems resulting from high unemployment.
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SOE do not negotiate in a commercially reasonable manner. Overzeal
for short-term gains due to a misapprehension about standard business
practices or to demands by government shareholders for immediate prof-
itability8 may damage Forestry Corporation's future financial health
and business reputation.82 For example, small dependent sawmilling op-
erations forced by Forestry Corporation to bear the entire burden of the
downturn in sawn timber demand83 may go bankrupt and leave Forestry
Corporation with fewer buyers in the future.
The SOE system requires the corporations to purchase their assets,
including the lands allocated to them, from the government.8 4 Of all the
SOE's created by the Labour Government, Forestry Corporation has
presented the most difficult asset valuation problem. 85 The New Zealand
Treasury and Forestry Corporation, the parties engaged in negotiating
the sale price of the forests, cannot agree on two crucial elements of the
valuation: (1) the price of wood over the next decade or two, and (2) an
appropriate discount rate. Slight differences in either figure can change
the value of forest assets by millions of dollars.8 6 Negotiations are fur-
ther complicated by the fact that, unlike a commercial negotiation where
the seller has most of the information regarding what is being sold, the
buyer of these forests, Forestry Corporation, has all of the information
and expertise regarding the forest resources being valued. In addition, it
is difficult to establish a true market price for the forests when there is no
true competing bidder.87
The inability of the Treasury and Forestry Corporation to agree on
an asset price has led the Government to propose retaining title to the
lands allocated to Forestry Corporation and leasing the timber resources.
The government would consider lease bids from any company. The aver-
age length of leases, under the proposed plan, would cover two rotations
of radiata pine (about sixty years). The length of the lease is designed to
encourage replanting after logging. Such issues as whether leaseholders
will be required to replant after "mining" the timber in the leased forest,
81. As owner of Forestry Corporation, the New Zealand Government looks to the SOE
to help reduce the nation's deficit. If the government does not sell the corporation, then it
needs to earn dividends from its shares in the company. Direct involvement by the sharehold-
ing ministers has not been reported, but more subtle pressure on the SOE's is rumored.
82. See, e.g., Murupara Threatened, The Daily Post (Rotorua), Jan. 23, 1989.
83. N.Z. FORESTRY CORP., 1988 ANN. REP. 6.
84. See infra notes 119-39 and accompanying text for a discussion of land allocation
problems.
85. Many SOE asset valuation negotiations have been difficult. R. Mascarenhas, Govern-
ment-Public Enterprise Relations-A Comparative Perspective 15 (1987) (paper delivered at
the Australian Political Studies Conference, Aug. 25-28, University of Auckland) (forthcom-
ing in AUSTRALIAN J. PUB. ADMIN.).
86. Claims about the value of the forests vary from $(N.Z.)l billion to S(N.Z.)5 billion.
Corporates Descend on State Forests, The Dominion Sunday Times, Oct. 16, 1988, at 31.
87. See P. McKINLAY, supra note 64, at 64 (criticizing the Government's approach of
.'arms length negotiations").
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especially in areas prone to erosion, remain unresolved.88 Regardless of
how leasing would be implemented, Forestry Corporation may become
less of a forest manager and more of a Crown real estate agent if the
Government moves forward with this plan.
Another issue that has faced Forestry Corporation, and other SOE's
generally, is its public accountability. 89 Forestry Corporation has officers
and a board of directors like a private corporation.90 The Minister
of Finance and the Minister for State-Owned Enterprises are the
only voting shareholders, but they may raise capital by issuing state en-
terprise equity bonds, which are nonvoting, ordinary shares. 91 Parlia-
ment monitors and evaluates SOE performance based on a statement of
corporate intent. 92 So far, Forestry Corporation has developed a corpo-
rate strategy without direct political interference. The shareholding min-
isters have generally distanced themselves from the day-to-day business
decisions of the SOE's. 93
While the government holds all the voting stock in the SOE's, their
public accountability has not been precisely defined and is the subject of
much debate in New Zealand. 94 Some argue that because SOE's have
been removed from the appropriations process Parliament will not scruti-
nize the enterprises and public accountability will be reduced. 95 Further-
more, before corporatisation, a Member of Parliament (M.P.) responding
to a constituent's inquiry about state forest management would go di-
rectly to NZFS. Now, the M.P. must go through one of the shareholding
ministers to reach the forest manager.96
88. Plan "Could Force New Zealand to Import Timber," The New Zealand Herald, Jan.
20, 1989; Government Plans Sales of Forests and Rural Banks, The New Zealand Herald, Dec.
24, 1988; Early Sales of Forestry Assets Planned, The New Zealand Herald, Dec. 23, 1988;
State Forest Sale Set to Go, Daily Post (Rotorua), Dec. 22, 1988.
89. See infra notes 94-101 and accompanying text.
90. N.Z. Stat. 124, §§ 5, 10, 11,.13 (1986). The board of directors represents a wide
range of skills and experience including banking, business, and forestry. NEW ZEALAND FOR-
ESTRY CORP., OUR FIRST Six MONTHS 2, 6 (1987). The Board appoints the Managing Direc-
tor of Forestry Corporation who, in turn, appoints the other officers. Most of the officers came
from positions in NZFS.
91. N.Z. Stat. 124, § 12 (1986). For a description of the role of the ministerial sharehold-
ers, see P. MCKINLAY, supra note 64, at 60-66. For a discussion of the nature of and problems
with equity bonds, see id. at 74-78.
92. R. Mascarenhas, supra note 85, at 15.
93. Id. at 17.
94. P. MCKINLAY, supra note 64, at 60-66; Boston, Transforming the Public Sector in
New Zealand: Labour's Quest for Improved Efficiency and Accountability, PuB. ADMIN.
(U.K.) (forthcoming). See generally Wylie, supra note 62.
95. Davies, State-Owned Enterprises Act: Accountability of State Enterprises and Respon-
sibility of Ministers, 10 PuB. SECTOR 4 (1987).
96. See State-Owned Enterprises Act of 1986, N.Z. Stat. 124, § 18 (providing that the




On the other hand, ministerial monitoring of performance may be
sufficient to insure that Forestry Corporation is responsive to public con-
cerns, so long as performance criteria are clearly set forth.97 The Labour
Government applies performance monitoring to Forestry Corporation as
well as to traditional government departments, requiring them to pro-
duce corporate-style statements of intent,98 and specifies department
administrators' performance criteria in their contracts. Public accounta-
bility is also protected to the extent that the public has a right, through
the Official Information Act,99 to receive copies of important government
documents; 100 however, it is unclear whether this right may be enforced
against Forestry Corporation t10
Perhaps surprisingly, one conflict that has not plagued Forestry
Corporation to date is the demand for recreational use of corporation
lands. The reason for this is that most of the lands are plantations, and
the recreationists have tended to prefer natural forests.'0 2 However, in
some cases access across (rather than to) SOE lands is important to rec-
reational users who want to reach preserves managed by the Department
of Conservation. 10 3 In addition, hunting and fishing have been popular
in some plantation forests. Current Forestry Corporation policy is to
allow public access to the forests with no more restrictions than NZFS
imposed. 10 4 Forestry Corporation benefits from the resulting good pub-
lic relations, but provides no guarantees that its policy will not change.
B. The Department of Conservation
The other major forest manager under the corporatisation reform is
the New Zealand Department of Conservation (DOC). DOC's various
roles with respect to New Zealand's natural resources are set out in the
Conservation Act of 1987:105
97. P. MCKINLAY, supra note 64, at 60-61; Palmer, supra note 71, at 29-31.
98. State-Owned Enterprises Act of 1986, N.Z. Stat. 124, § 14 (requiring SOE's to pro-
duce annual statements of corporate intent). For an example of such a statement, see NEW
ZEALAND MINISTRY FOR THE ENVIRONMENT, CORPORATE PLAN 6 (Apr. 1, 1988-Mar. 31,
1989).
99. Official Information Act of 1982, N.Z. Stat. 156, as amended by N.Z. Stat. 8 (1987).
100. Id. §§ 21-22.
101. The Act allows SOE's to protect information where disclosure would expose a trade
secret or unreasonably prejudice the commercial position of the SOE or the subject of the
information. Official Information Act Amendment of 1987, N.Z. Stat. 8, § 5. See generally
Wylie, supra note 62, at 45.
102. The distribution of recreation in the public forests of New Zealand thus contrasts
sharply with the rich mix of uses allowed in natural public forests in the United States.
103. Barr, Access and the Land Carve-Up, FEDERATED MOUNTAIN CLUBS BULL., Dec.
1987, at 15-17.
104. To regulate hunters, Forestry Corporation requires them to obtain free permits at a
Forestry Corporation office.
105. N.Z. Stat. 65 (1987).
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(a) To manage for conservation' 0 6 purposes, all lands, and all other
natural and historic resources being held under this Act...
(b) To advocate the conservation of natural and historical resources
generally
(c) To promote the benefits to present and future generations of...
the conservation of natural and historic resources ....
(e) To the extent that the use of any natural or historic resource is
not inconsistent with its conservation, to foster the use of natural and
historic resources for recreation, and to allow their use for tourism.' 0 7
The rationale behind corporatisation was to divide land manage-
ment into two single objective categories: production and protection,
with Forestry Corporation responsible for the former and DOC for the
latter. 0 8 However, DOC is really a multiple-objective manager con-
cerned with providing a full spectrum of uses (except logging). These
include recreation, education, moss harvesting, grazing, mining, and en-
vironmental protection. 0 9 In the austere fiscal climate of the late 1980's,
balancing these often conflicting objectives is a politically sensitive task,
and the division of lands between Forestry Corporation and DOC has
not avoided conflict.
The Labour Government's fiscal program requires many agencies to
earn a portion of their budgetary needs. The New Zealand Treasury ulti-
mately expects DOC to raise 20% of its expenditures through user
charges." 0 This requirement adds pressure for DOC to deploy its re-
sources in a manner that creates a broad revenue base. Of course, tim-
ber, potentially the most valuable DOC asset, is the one commodity
DOC is forbidden from selling. ' In its first year of operation, DOC
overspent its $(N.Z.)l 11 million budget by $(N.Z.)3.5 million. 1 2 This
106. The Act defines conservation as "the preservation and protection of natural and his-
toric resources for the purpose of maintaining their intrinsic values, providing for their appre-
ciation and recreational enjoyment by the public, and safeguarding the options of future
generations." Id. § 2.
107. Id. § 6.
108. Boston, supra note 94, at 11.
109. See generally Kirkland, supra note 62, at 12 (broad statement of the resources for
which DOC is responsible). DOC is also involved in marine protection and in the permitting
procedure for mining and coastal development. In most cases, DOC personnel responsible for
management and planning came from NZFS. Some environmentalists feel that these adminis-
trators are not sufficiently committed to preservation.
110. Barr, User Pays, FEDERATED MOUNTAIN CLUBS BULL., Mar. 1988, at 14. In fiscal
year 1988-89, DOC will be required to raise 12.5% of its revenue, up from 8% the previous
year. Government Departments Say How They'll Cope, The Evening Post (Wellington), July
29, 1988, at 8, col. 7. DOC districts containing popular national parks raise revenue relatively
easily through recreation-related user charges. Some DOC districts raise funds through per-
mits to harvest sphagnum moss and other non-timber resources.
11. Conservation Act of 1987, N.Z. Stat. 65, § 30(3). DOC may not sell the land it man-
ages either. Id. § 16(1)(b).
112. NEW ZEALAND, COMMENTARY ON THE ESTIMATES OF THE EXPENDITURE OF THE
GOVERNMENT OF NEW ZEALAND FOR THE YEAR ENDING 31 MARCH 1989 (1989).
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deficit will be added to the amount DOC will be required to recover
through revenue or cost-cutting in the 1988-89 fiscal year, placing even
more pressure on the agency to favor revenue generating uses.1 3
Some of DOC's budget difficulties result from costs inherited from
other agencies and the initial start-up expenses of a new department. "14
However, part of the financial problem comes from the fact that, unlike
Forestry Corporation, DOC retains a NZFS-like centralized hierarchy
that produces high overhead costs.11 5 The organizational structure re-
quires forest offices to report to district conservators, who report to re-
gional managers, who, in turn, report to the central office in
Wellington."' 16
Once DOC's organizational structure was designed, hiring guide-
lines virtually prevented DOC managers from employing personnel from
outside government service. 117 Moreover, the people who were hired
were poorly deployed. For example, in the Auckland region, one district
office has an exclusive concentration of wildlife expertise, while the
neighboring office has a concentration of forestry expertise. A consensus
is growing that too many DOC workers are at the central and regional
offices, and not enough are in the field.""8 Furthermore, too few DOC
employees have the expertise in financial or personnel management
needed to solve these types of problems.
113. DOC's gross allocation for 1988-89 is $(N.Z.)109 million. The Department must
recover $(N.Z.)13.1 million of this gross allocation. In 1987-88, DOC recovered $(N.Z.) 8.3
million of its budget. Id.; see also Townsend, Department Fights for its Life, The New Zealand
Herald, July 22, 1988, at 1, col. 1.
114. DOC's main problems "derive from financial and resource allocations which appear
to be insufficient to carry out the requirements of the Conservation Act 1987." NEW ZEA-
LAND NATIONAL PARKS AND RESERVES AUTHORITY, REPORT FOR THE YEAR ENDING 31
AUGUST 1988, at 3; see also Townsend, supra note 113.
115. The SOE's internal structures are created by independent boards of business people.
DOC, like all government departments, was organized by the State Services Commission,
which creates and evaluates the institutional structures of the New Zealand bureaucracy.
116. New Zealand Department of Conservation, Rotorua Regional Newsletter (n.d.).
Each regional office divides DOC's responsibilities into a number of categories staffed by spe-
cialists. Id. DOC employees in the field complain that communication through the hierarchy
is garbled and slow. Unlike NZFS, which could rely on the common training of its employees
to help communication, DOC employs professionals with backgrounds in rival agencies
(NZFS, Department of Lands and Survey, and New Zealand Wildlife Service) who lack a
common base of experience.
117. Hiring guidelines were established by the State Services Commission. Wilkinson
notes that the domination of USFS by people trained in forestry hinders interdisciplinary mul-
tiple-resource management. Wilkinson, supra note 8, at 27. Because DOC is dominated by
foresters from NZFS, it must struggle to broaden its perspective on wildlife, recreation, and
wilderness issues.
118. The Government now plans to implement a consultant's suggestion to restructure
DOC by decentralizing authority. Interview with Dr. Peter Alan Simpson, Member of Parli-
ment, in Washington, D.C. (June 9, 1989).
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C. Land Allocation
One of the most controversial issues associated with corporatisation
is the allocation of land between DOC and Forestry Corporation. The
government allocated land to Forestry Corporation if its production val-
ues outweighed its conservation values. "19 Based on this principle, exotic
plantation forests were allocated to Forestry Corporation, and national
parks and reserves were allocated to DOC. However, disagreement arose
in areas where indigenous natural forests were suitable for logging or
previously had been logged. Many of the areas valuable for both conser-
vation and production became the focus of intense lobbying. 120
The initial attempt at allocating lands was made by a panel created
by NZFS during the final months of its existence. This first attempt was
vociferously criticized by a coalition of environmental groups. Some in-
digenous forests were allocated to Forestry Corporation because NZFS
had developed long-term harvesting plans. Other public forests with
stands of both exotic and indigenous trees were also allocated to Forestry
Corporation. Finally, many boundaries were drawn with no regard for
terrain or vegetation patterns.
In response to these perceived shortcomings, the environmental coa-
lition produced a large volume of maps showing where they felt the allo-
cation was in error and why. The coalition's effort forced the
Government to propose two more allocation plans; the reiterations of the
planning process eventually reduced the areas in dispute to a few
dozen. 121
Some people in the timber industry criticized DOC for its eagerness
to deny land to Forestry Corporation. Because DOC was not going to
pay for its allocated land, the critics maintained that, unlike the SOE, it
had no incentive to take account of the costs of preserving forest lands.
On the other hand, some environmentalists criticized DOC for not advo-
cating preservation zealously enough. Blame often was placed on former
NZFS employees who were perceived as carrying a timber production
bias over to DOC. Although DOC knew that there was not much room
119. Report of Technical Advisory Group on Land Allocation Criteria, attachment 4
(n.d.) (report prepared for the Ministerial Co-ordinating Committee on State Owned
Enterprises).
120. T. Buhrs, supra note 50, at 4 ("conservation of indigenous forests... has dominated
environmental demands and actions in New Zealand."). Protecting the remaining native for-
ests in New Zealand has been a major goal of environmentalists for the past decade. Environ-
mentalists supported corporatisation based on the Government's promise to establish a new
land conservation agency that would protect natural areas. Therefore, allocation of indigenous
forest to DOC was a central environmentalist goal: NEW ZEALAND STATE SERVICE COMMIS-
SION, REPORT OF THE POST-ENVIRONMENT FORUM WORKING PARTY, ENVIRONMENT 1986
27-38 (1985) (outlining a Heritage New Zealand department that would champion conserva-
tion interests).
121. A broader representation of SOE and environmental interests than the original NZFS
land allocation panel participated in these subsequent efforts.
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for its budget to be altered to reflect its land management responsibilities,
its official strategy was to seek allocation of all indigenous forests. In the
end, most disputed lands were allocated to preservation. 122
Even in cases where indigenous forest was finally allocated to For-
estry Corporation, environmentalists were able to protect some natural
values by having three covenants placed on the title. The covenants re-
quire sustained yield management, public access, and the maintenance of
native species (i.e., no exotic interplanting). 123 The enforceability and
effectiveness of these covenants is, however, untested.
The dispute over land allocation in New Zealand was particularly
acute concerning the indigenous forests of Westland and Southland,1 24
where political compromises were necessary to tip the scales in favor of
conservation values. In the northern part of Westland, the new Ministry
for the Environment mediated the allocation issue. Working parties
composed of representatives from government agencies, regional govern-
ment, environmental groups, and industry hammered out compromises
that left some indigenous forests under productive use, keeping local saw
mills supplied with native timber until sources of exotic timber become
available. Again, however, most lands were allocated to the Department
of Conservation under a compromise accord. 125
In contrast to Westland, Southland had no ongoing native logging
operations. Nevertheless, Forestry Corporation earmarked indigenous
forests that had been logged in the past for future harvesting. Here, the
allocation decision was made directly by a committee of Labour M.P.'s,
with no recommendation from local interest groups. 126 Although some
122. Kirkland, supra note 62, at 11-12. DOC now manages 26% of New Zealand's land
area, while Forestry Corporation's allocated lands consist of 3% of the country's land area. 93
OFFICIAL YEARBOOK, supra note 45, at 497.
123. A. Gibson, The Use of Mediation in Environmental Impact Assessment-West Coast
Forests Experience 7 (1988).
124. These two areas on the South Island have the most extensive intact indigenous forests
in New Zealand.
125. See A. Gibson, supra note 123, at 5-6 for a summary of the mediation process. In the
southern part of Westland, the working party was unable to come up with a workable compro-
mise. It recommended that over 90% of the public forest land be allocated to DOC with the
remainder held in neutral tenure while the government studies its potential for sustained yield
timber management. See generally NEW ZEALAND MINISTRY FOR THE ENVIRONMENT,
SOUTH WESTLAND SOUTH OF THE COOK RIVER RESOURCE MANAGEMENT STUDY-SUM-
MARY OF FINAL REPORT (1988). However, in February 1989, the Minister for the Environ-
ment announced that the Government would allocate all of the public forest to DOC. In
return, the government will spend $(N.Z.) 1.5 million over the next three years to improve
recreational and tourist facilities in the area. Gibson, South Westland Forests Decision, ENVI-
RONMENT UPDATE, March 1989, at 3.
126. The M.P.'s most involved with land allocation were sympathetic to the environ-
mentalist viewpoint. It was as much the influence of nongovernmental environmental organi-
zations as DOC that resulted in the land being allocated to DOC.
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lands were allocated to logging, the amounts were not sufficient to sus-
tain an indigenous logging operation.' 27
In both Westland and Southland, the allocation disputes were emo-
tional, divisive issues. Communities already economically depressed
from the downturn in domestic timber demand and the strong New Zea-
land dollar felt that the environmentalists had no regard for the human
cost of forest preservation. Many environmentalists viewed the indige-
nous timber industry as moribund and favored a quick death for it before
the remaining native trees were felled. Although the environmentalists
appear to have gotten the best of the allocations, they have done so at
some political cost.
Another controversial allocation issue involved the riparian areas
along the margins of rivers. The Act establishing DOC requires that
these marginal strips be held for conservation purposes. 128 Conse-
quently, a twenty-meter corridor on each side of every stream on land
transferred to Forestry Corporation was reserved by the Crown for man-
agement by DOC. 129 However, the SOE's are now lobbying to amend
the law so that they will own these strips of land. They object to the high
cost of fencing and surveying to exclude riparian areas from the rest of
their property. Also, the SOE's want to be able to exclude certain forms
of recreation during periods when the surrounding land is sensitive to
damage.' 30 Finally, there is the potential problem that an underfunded
DOC will be unable to control noxious weeds and animal pests on the
marginal strips.
Perhaps the most difficult and unforeseen issue arising from
corporatisation is the acceleration of Maori claims to land the Govern-
ment is proposing to transfer to the SOE's.1'1 In 1840, the Treaty of
Waitangi established the relationship between the British and the native
Maori people in the New Zealand colony.' 32 In 1975, the Treaty of
Waitangi Tribuna' 3 3 began hearing claims by Maori people to land and
127. According to Forestry Corporation, the proposed allocation would have provided
timber for logging for only 10 years; however, regeneration would take 40 years. DOC Taking
Over Beech Forests, The Southland Times, July 10, 1988, at 1, col. 1.
128. Conservation Act of 1987, N.Z. Stat. 65, § 24.
129. Id. The set-aside of riparian areas also applies to transfers of property to another
entity, the New Zealand Land Corporation. Land Corporation, like Forestry Corporation,
operates under the system outlined in the State-Owned Enterprises Act of 1986, N.Z. Stat. 124.
Land Corporation, which engages in commercial farming, assumed the production function of
the Department of Lands and Survey.
130. Forestry Corporation is concerned about fire hazards and Land Corporation is con-
cerned about agitation of livestock during calving season.
131. The former Director General of DOC claims that some officials raised the issue of
Maori land claims in 1985. Letter from K.W. Piddington to Robert Fischman (Nov. 20,
1988).
132. C. ORANGE, THE TREATY OF WAITANGI (1987); Walker, A Nation's Pride N.Z.
LISTENER, Oct. 1, 1988, at 80.
133. Treaty of Waitangi Act of 1975, N.Z. Stat. 114, § 4. In 1985, The Treaty of Waitangi
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other natural resources that had been taken in abrogation of the
Treaty. 134 As in the United States, in New Zealand the European rela-
tionship with native peoples has not been characterized by fair play.
Many Maori claims to resources on Crown land have long lain dor-
mant. However, the number and extent of claims on Crown land grew
considerably with the specter of land transfers to corporations, particu-
larly because the state-owned entities are able to alienate property. 135
The State-Owned Enterprises Act mandates that the Crown act in a
manner consistent with the principles of the Treaty of Waitangi. 136 In a
landmark decision, the highest court in New Zealand found that Section
9 of the Act prohibits the Crown from transferring land to the SOE's
until safeguards are established to prevent prejudice to foreseeable Maori
claims.1 37 Parliament has responded by passing a bill that will allow the
government to transfer land, yet resume its interest in the land if a claim
is judged valid by the Tribunal. 13  In most cases this will protect suc-
cessful Maori claimants from having to seek relief from private landown-
ers. However, the Tribunal also would have the power to recommend
that some land be exempt from the Crown's power of resumption. 139
Until asset valuation and land transfers are complete, 140 Forestry Corpo-
ration operates under a deed of license from the Crown.' 4 1
Even though it was recently expanded, the Treaty of Waitangi Tri-
bunal will take years to adjudicate Maori resource claims, given the cur-
rent backlog.142 The increased political activism of many Maori groups
has focused national attention on the issue of Maori rights and the Maori
condition in New Zealand. The Government's most recent plan to sell
Amendment Act of 1985, N.Z. Stat. 148, gave the tribunal power to investigate Maori griev-
ances dating back to 1840. Id. § 3.
134. For the procedures for filing a claim under the Treaty, see Treaty of Waitangi Act of
1975, N.Z. Stat. 114, § 6 and Treaty of Waitangi Amendment Act of 1985, N.Z. Stat. 148, § 3.
135. State-Owned Enterprises Act of 1986, N.Z. Stat. 124, § 23 (authorizing the transfer
of full title to Crown assets, including land, to state enterprises); see Ansley, Settling Up, N.Z.
LISTNER, Aug. 6, 1988, at 16-18 (describing the settlement terms of various recent claims); see
England, The Empire Strikes Back, N.Z. LISTENER, Oct. 8, 1988, at 32 (describing the Ngai
Tahu land claim to almost all of the Crown land on the South Island). Approximately 4% of
the original Maori estate remains in Maori ownership. Walker, supra note 132, at 80.
136. N.Z. Stat. 124, § 9 (1986).
137. New Zealand Maori Council v. Attorney-General, 1 N.Z.L.R. 641 (C.A. 1987).
138. Treaty of Waitangi (State Enterprises) Bill, House of Representatives, May 5, 1988.
The bill permits the Treaty of Waitangi Tribunal to make a binding recommendation for the
return to Maori ownership of any land transferred to an SOE. The Government now permits
SOE's to transfer assets (such as timber) on the land that is subject to Maori claims.
139. Id. § 8a.
140. Id. § 10.
141. NEW ZEALAND FORESTRY CORP., supra note 90, at 1.
142. Large claims are taking as long as two years to work through the tribunal process.
Ansley, supra note 135, at 16-18. There are currently 164 claims before the tribunal, which
has recently increased its membership from 7 to 17 in an attempt to reduce this large backlog
of cases. Tribunal Gets New Members, The Wellington Post, Mar. 13, 1989.
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leases to timber companies to use land allocated to Forestry Corporation
for logging creates further problems for Maori groups. If the Tribunal
validates Maori claims to commercial Crown forest land, then the Maori
claimants may receive land title, but no right to use the land until the
leases expire. 143 Maori interests are likely to oppose the leasing plan.'44
D. Other Pieces of the Corporatisation Puzzle
The aftermath of forest corporatisation in New Zealand cannot be
described completely by just the experiences of Forestry Corporation and
DOC. A number of resource management functions are filled by neither
institution. The government, through NZFS, used to oversee half the
logging in New Zealand. 145 Corporatisation removed this central gov-
ernment control over timber practices on public lands. At present, no
new agency fills this void by regulating the environmental effects of
logging. 146
1. Timber Practice Regulation
Forestry Corporation is designed to operate in the manner of a pri-
vate business and, thus, has no specific duty to consider or mitigate the
environmental effects of its logging practices. The corporation currently
manages slightly over half of New Zealand's production forests. 14 7 If
Forestry Corporation receives title to this land, it will have the authority
to sell parcels to private companies. 148 Therefore, the proportion of log-
ging on land not subject to direct central government control will in-
crease in the future. 14 9 If, however, the government leases the land to
Forestry Corporation, the government will need to determine the degree
of control it will exercise over timber practices.
143. The term of the proposed forest leases would commit the timber for at least 30 years.
This method of transferring assets would bypass the treaty of Waitangi because title to the
land would remain with the Crown. Maori Council chairman Sir Graham Latimer character-
ized the Government's leasing proposal as an insult. Forest Plan an Insult Says Latimer, THE
DOMINION, Nov. 29, 1988, at 2, col. 1.
144. Hui Discusses Forest Plans, The Daily Post (Rotorua), Jan. 20, 1989; Plan "Could
Force New Zealand to Import Timber, "supra note 88; Government Accused of Tricking Maori.
The Daily Post (Rotorua), Jan. 17, 1989. Maori involvement in public decisionmaking contin-
ues to be inadequate. NEW ZEALAND MINISTRY FOR THE ENVIRONMENT, ENVIRONMENT
UPDATE 7 (Feb. 1989). The Labour Party may also oppose further efforts to reduce public
control of Crown assets. Government Plans Sale of Forests and Rural Banks, supra note 88.
145. See supra notes 45-56 and accompanying text.
146. In other areas, services that used to be provided by NZFS or the Department of
Lands and Survey are now provided by new agencies such as the Ministry of Forestry and the
Department of Lands. See generally infra notes 147-66 and accompanying text.
147. NEW ZEALAND FORESTRY CORP., supra note 90, at 18 (graph).
148. See supra notes 131-43 and accompanying text.
149. The regulation of timber practices is important to protect water quality, stream beds,
soils, animal habitats, and other conservation values. It is especially important when the costs
of environmental degradation are borne outside of the property being logged.
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Traditionally, there has been little central government regulation of
land use or logging on private lands in New Zealand. Although local
planning boards control land use, 150 they have not attempted forest prac-
tice regulations like the programs in some states in the United States.' 5 1
If aggressively pursued, the Labour Government's policy of "devolu-
tion," which is intended to enlarge the responsibilities of regional govern-
ments, 5 2 may embolden local authorities to oversee forest management
more actively. 153 On the other hand, regional economic pressures may
lead local authorities to be lax about regulations. 154
While the New Zealand Government no longer has direct control
over the forest practices of SOE's, it may still regulate forestry-proce-
dures by mandating environmental impact statements. Private projects
that are of a certain size and that need licenses under a variety of laws
activate impact statement requirements. 5 5 Removal of timber falls
under these licensing requirements.156 The Ministry for the Environ-
ment, which is currently reviewing these laws, 1 57 proposes to strengthen
150. Local planning boards operate under the authority of the Town and Country Plan-
ning Act of 1977, N.Z. Stat. 121.
151. See, e.g., Z'berg-Nejedly Forest Practice Act of 1973, CAL. PUB. RES. CODE §§ 4511-
4628 (West 1984 & Supp. 1989); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, §§ 681-689 (1964 & Supp.
1988); OR. REV. STAT. §§ 527.610-.992 (1987); Wis. STAT. ANN.. § 77.80-,86 (West 1987).
152. A number of observers are skeptical about Labour's commitment to devolve real au-
thority to regions. Fisher, The New Environmental Management Regime in New Zealand,
ENVTL. & PLAN. L.J., Mar. 1987, at 41. There is also some question as to whether the regions
have the resources to handle greater responsibility. NEW ZEALAND MINISTRY FOR THE EN-
VIRONMENT, PROPOSED POLICY ON ENVIRONMENTAL ASSESSMENT PROCEDURES 14 (1987).
See generally LOCAL GOVERNMENT DIVISION, NEW ZEALAND DEPARTMENT OF INTERNAL
AFFAIRS, REPORT OF THE REGIONAL GOVERNMENT WORKING PARTY (1988); NEW ZEA-
LAND OFFICIALS CO-ORDINATING COMMITTEE ON LOCAL GOVERNMENT, REFORM OF Lo-
CAL AND REGIONAL GOVERNMENT (1988).
153. This trend already may have begun in the Nelson area where a county council plan-
ning scheme makes clearance of native forest a conditional land use rather than a right. Judg-
ment Sets Precedent for Forest Protection, NAT'L BUS. REV. [New Zealand], Nov. 25, 1987, at
7, col. 2; Forest Firm Loses Case, New Zealand Herald, July 27, 1988.
154. Native Forests Action Council, supra note 62, at 3, 8, 10 (describing the concern that
local tribunals will be more amenable to economic development projects than national conser-
vation needs).
Another trend in land use regulation is for landowners to grant conservation covenants to
a private trust. At least one SOE, Land Corporation, has expressed an interest in working
with the Queen Elizabeth the Second National Trust to arrange for conservation covenants on
some of its farm land formerly managed by the Department of Lands and Survey,
155. NEW ZEALAND MINISTRY FOR THE ENVIRONMENT, ENVIRONMENTAL PROTEC-
TION AND ENHANCEMENT PROCEDURES 3-5 (1987). Impact statements may be required at
the discretion of local bodies or ministers. Fisher, supra note 152, at 39. Impact statements (in
the form of assessments or reports) discuss the environmental consequences of actions and
possible measures to mitigate harmful impacts, but do not require selection of any particular
project option or mitigation strategy. See generally Morgan, Reshaping Environmental Impact
Assessment in New Zealand, 8 ENVTL. IMPACT ASSESSMENT REV. 293 (1988) (outlining the
history of environmental assessment in New Zealand and current reforms).
156. NEW ZEALAND MINISTRY FOR THE ENVIRONMENT, supra note 155, at 1.
157. NEW ZEALAND MINISTRY FOR THE ENVIRONMENT, LAWS UNDER REVIEW (1988)
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environmental impact statement requirements for corporate
operations. 158
Another option for regulating the environmental effects of private
timber management is the Parliamentary Commissioner for the Environ-
ment, who monitors the overall system of environmental protection in
New Zealand. While the Commissioner's oversight responsibilities en-
compass regulation of SOE practices,1 59 she has no enforcement author-
ity and few resources. 160 Her power is the special status and
independence of her office, which has a direct line of communication to
government ministers.161
The limitations of these regulatory components was illustrated in
the case of a proposed management plan for an indigenous beech forest
in Westland. When NZFS was managing this forest, it had decided that
a public management plan was necessary to address environmental con-
cerns over logging. However, Forestry Corporation refused to prepare
such a plan once the lands were transferred to it. In response, the Beech
Forests Action Council complained to the Parliamentary Commissioner
for the Environment. The Commissioner decided that it was not possible
to force Forestry Corporation to issue a plan covering such a broad area;
the SOE could only be compelled to produce plans for specific logging
operations.
2. Ministry of Forestry
Another new government agency created in the wake of corporatisa-
tion is the Ministry of Forestry. TheMinistry provides the research, pol-
icy, and consulting expertise that formerly resided in NZFS. Because the
Ministry of Forestry's activities are more marketable than DOC's, it is
expected to recover an even greater portion of its expenditures than
DOC. 16 2 Pursuant to this policy, the agency now charges for consulting
with private landholders and solicits private funding from the benefi-
ciaries of forestry research.163 As a result, the emphasis of research has
shifted to more commercially useful applications.
(press packet issued in May 1988); NEW ZEALAND MINISTRY FOR THE ENVIRONMENT, RE-
VIEW OF RESOURCE MANAGEMENT STATUTES - UPDATE ON PROGRESS 2 (1988).
158. NEW ZEALAND MINISTRY FOR THE ENVIRONMENT, PROPOSED POLICY ON ENVI-
RONMENTAL ASSESSMENT PROCEDURES 18-19 (1987).
159. Environment Act of 1986, N.Z. Stat. 127, § 16.
160. Fisher, supra note 152, at 42 (describing the functions and faults of the office of Par-
liamentary Commissioner).
161. Id.
162. See, e.g., ESTIMATES 1988, supra note 68, at 22 (DOC to provide 8.1% of its budget
from receipts), 55 (Ministry of Forestry to provide I 1% of its budget from receipts).
163. The Ministry also has a small regulatory role, currently under review, in overseas
trade of forest products.
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3. The Department of Lands
Lands that were not allocated to Forestry Corporation, DOC, or
Land Corporation are managed by a transitional custodian, the new De-
partment of Lands. Department of Lands property is either (1) too diffi-
cult or politically sensitive to allocate, or (2) not appropriate for either
preservation. or commercial management. The Government initially
planned to dissolve Department of Lands once the allocation of the first
category and the sale of the second category were complete.'64 However,
unexpected difficulties arose. Thus, the Crown continues to hold many
sensitive tracts of land through Department of Lands, but contracts with
the SOE's for management.1 65 Other properties that are too small to
survey economically are also being retained by the Department of
Lands.166 As a result of these problems, the Department of Lands has
grown beyond the size originally expected by the Government. Its future
is currently under review. For now, the Department of Lands represents
an ongoing expense of the awkward transition to corporatisation.
IV
LEARNING FROM THE NEW ZEALAND EXPERIENCE
The reality of corporatisation in New Zealand is that it has caused
unanticipated changes in areas other than land management. Studying
the New Zealand experience illuminates important issues not considered
in corporatisation proposals, such as native peoples' land claims, job dis-
placement, and SOE accountability to public concerns. These issues
must be resolved before corporatisation can be supported on an environ-
mental or economic basis. Furthermore, the details of the corporatisa-
tion process, such as the criteria used to allocate lands and resources
between forest corporations and wilderness trusts, and the institutional
structures of the new management organizations are pivotal to the feasi-
bility of reforms in the United States. The New Zealand experience dem-
onstrates that one cannot reform just forest management.
164. ESTIMATES 1988, supra note 68, at 83. In South Westland, land that both DOC and
Forestry Corporation wanted to manage was held neutrally by the Department of Lands until
a final allocation decision was made. NEW ZEALAND MINISTRY FOR THE ENVIRONMENT,
supra note 125, § 6.
165. For instance, high country pastoral lease lands are held by Department of Lands.
Land Corporation manages the leases under a licensing agreement with the government.
166. The Crown continually acquires small parcels of land that escheat to it. Also, some
of the public domain consists of parcels for which title has never been issued. The Survey and
Land Information Department estimates that a complete survey of public forests allocated to
Forestry Corporation will require $(N.Z.) 21 million over three years. Pirie, $21 Million for
Full Survey of Forests, THE DOMINION, Nov. 30, 1988.
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A. The Initial Allocation of Resources
Proposals for forest management reform concentrate on how re-
sources are to be managed by different agencies or companies, but fail to
focus on the crucial issue of how these resources are to be allocated ini-
tially. 167 Allocation of resources, however, is the critical step in corpo-
rate management because it determines how lands valuable for both
preservation and production are used.
In New Zealand, the blueprints for corporatisation did not examine
how lands would be divided between Forestry Corporation and DOC.
Because there was no plan, the first land allocation was attempted in
haste and the entire process had to be repeated several times to address
logistical and political objections.168 Logistical objections can be reduced
by studying the character of the land before allocating it.169 Political
objections can be reduced by mandating agreement on a fair allocation
process before allocation begins. 170
In the United States, where national forests include a wider variety
of ecosystems and where productive forests are not dominated by exotic
plantations, land allocation would be even more difficult than in New
Zealand.' 17  Almost all USFS land is valued highly for its natural fea-
tures. Forestry Corporation's land base, after the settlement of a series of
allocation controversies, now consists almost entirely of exotic planta-
tions that environmentalists do not value highly. Because little USFS
land is analogous to New Zealand's exotic plantations, partitioning USFS
land in a manner similar to the New Zealand example would be
impossible.
O'Toole suggests that wilderness areas be excluded from the lands
transferred to forest corporations. 172  Environmentalists, if faced with
167. Allocation is crucial because "even perfectly competitive markets will lead to out-
comes conditional on a particular distribution of resources." Runge, Rejoinder. Looking
Again at !he New Resource Economics, J. CONTEMP. STUD., Spr. 1984, at 63, 75 (citing J.
HENDERSON & R. QUANDT, MICROECONOMIc THEORY 264 (2d ed. 1971)).
168. See supra notes 121-24 and accompanying text.
169. Kirkland notes that "[n]o economic studies have been undertaken to guide the alloca-
tion of land although the process in effect classifies forest land into that expected to earn a
commercial rate of return on the asset and that exempt from such consideration by virtue of
higher value in some other use." Kirkland, supra note 62, at 11.
170. Of course, this is easier said than done. USFS planning illustrates the difficulties
involved in persuading parties representing conflicting interests to agree on objectives. NA-
TIONAL WILDLIFE FEDERATION, OUR NATIONAL FORESTS: WILL THE FUTURE BE DIFFER-
ENT? 7 (1988). See generally P. CULHANE, PUBLIC LANDS POLITICS (1981) (exploring how
interest groups participate in USFS decisionmaking).
171. Indigenous species plantations do exist on USFS land. See generally THE WILDER-
NESS SOCIETY, FORESTS OF THE FUTURE? 6 (1987).
172. R. O'TOOLE, supra note 2, at 14; see also Teeguarden & Thomas, supra note 2, at 381
(transfer of wilderness areas to the, National Park Service instead of forest corporations as a
means of dealing with wilderness management issues). These corporatisation proposals do not
justify the authors' distinguishing lands that are designated wilderness from lands primarily
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such reforms, should ensure that clear, workable criteria are developed
ahead of time to decide which lands will be designated for profit max-
imization, and which will be designated for protection. Until a politi-
cally acceptable process is created for dividing lands, the dilemma of
multiple use remains. 73
One approach to land allocation in the United States would be to
divide forests along the current Wilderness Preservation System bounda-
ries. However, that might effectively freeze any further wilderness
designation on national forest lands because corporations utilizing the
potential wilderness land are likely to oppose any diminution of their
asset base.1 74 Also, some corporations may preempt wilderness designa-
tion by logging potential wilderness lands to generate cash for investment
or debt service. Such questions as whether Congress would compensate a
forestry corporation for designating additional wilderness, and what
Congress would do with current roadless areas eligible for inclusion in
the Wilderness Preservation System, should be answered before
corporatisation is pursued.
The assertion of dormant claims of the Maori people for resources
on public lands was a largely unexpected consequence of corporatisa-
tion. 71 Native Americans, who also prefer to place claims on public
rather than private lands, would find it in their interest to assert rights to
resources on national forests before the forests are corporatised. In New
Zealand, the Maori community was not involved in the debates that gave
rise to corporatisation, and the potential danger to Maori interests was
not fully understood by the policymakers until the Court of Appeals
halted implementation. Forest reformers in the United States must work
with Indian tribes to ensure that corporatisation would not compromise
Indian interests. The reforms proposed by O'Toole, and Teeguarden and
Thomas, do not project how corporate management might affect Indian
claims or activities on national forest lands.176
Implementing corporatisation is not just a question of allocating
lands and resources. In New Zealand, the valuation of assets has been
almost as controversial as deciding which lands would be managed for
production. The awkward negotiation of a purchase price for the forests
in New Zealand has collapsed, precipitating plans for the competitive
important for solitude, wildlife, or watershed protection that are not designated wilderness. If
there is no distinction, then determining the excluded lands is likely to be an arduous and
politically divisive exercise.
173. See Kirkland, supra note 62, at 12.
174. O'Toole suggests that donations and receipts from wilderness lands may be used to
purchase new lands of the same type. R. O'TOOLE, supra note 2, at 216. However, this would
require wilderness lands to generate enough revenue to exceed management costs.
175. See supra notes 131-39 and accompanying text.
176. It remains to be seen whether the public trust doctrine would constrain the transfer of
management or title to public corporations.
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sale of timber leases on land allocated to Forestry Corporation. 177
O'Toole recognizes the difficulties with asset valuation and avoids the
problem by proposing that the U.S. Treasury receive a share of each for-
est company's receipts rather than require up-front payments. 178
Teeguarden and Thomas, however, suggest that their proposed Public
Corporations Board establish a minimum rate of return for each corpora-
tion's assets. 179 This would require an initial valuation of forest assets
that is at best troublesome and at worst a serious barrier to implementing
corporatisation. 180
B. Transition Management
Even if New Zealand had worked out the initial allocation of re-
sources before implementing corporatisation, it still would have faced
difficulties because too little attention was directed at how the transition
from NZFS to Forestry Corporation and DOC would work. Policymak-
ers must provide for a period of adjustment to allow people affected by
institutional reforms to respond to a new climate of market incentives., 8
As in New Zealand, a reduction of uneconomic logging operations
in the United States would increase unemployment in the timber indus-
try. O'Toole recognizes the need to cushion workers and recommends
putting a portion of the funds formerly appropriated to USFS in a fund
available to displaced employees.1 82 The transition for workers also
could be eased through training programs, worker relocation, and a
gradual reduction in logging.' 83
Displaced workers are not the only people who need retraining to
adapt to a corporatised forest system. The New Zealand experience
teaches that some forest service professionals will find niches in the new
corporations, but also that these workers need time to adjust to market
incentives and business practices. 184 Managers who are accustomed to
planning timber sales need training to learn about promoting recreation
and other land uses. One of DOC's difficulties in fulfilling its multiple
177. See supra notes 84-88 and accompanying text.
178. R. O'TOOLE, supra note 2, at 213.
179. Teeguarden & Thomas, supra note 2, at 380, 383.
180. O'Toole criticizes the Teeguarden and Thomas approach because the valuation of
assets is difficult and could result in lower operating funds for the national forests. R.
O'TOOLE, supra note 2, at 218-19.
181. This is not to say that implementation of such a reform should be slow. However, in
structuring or evaluating a new agency or quasi-public entity, reformers must account for the
period of time during which people adjust to a new institutional climate and shape new stan-
dard operating procedures. The checks and balances in the federal government guarantee that
corporatisation, if it could happen in the United States, would happen more slowly.
182. R. O'TOOLE, supra note 2, at 226. Workers can be given stock in the corporation if
nonpublic shares are to be issued.
183. Id.
184. See supra notes 81-83 and accompanying text.
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use mandate has been that few resources are available for teaching for-
mer NZFS, Department of Lands and Survey, and Wildlife Service em-
ployees about the skills of their colleagues from other agencies. As a
result it has been difficult to get the agency to work as a coherent whole.
Finally, it is not sufficient to privatize only capital resources. With-
out the flexibility to fire and promote employees at will, forest corpora-
tions in the United States would have difficulty establishing true market
incentives for their personnel. Neither O'Toole nor Teeguarden and
Thomas indicate how civil service regulations will affect corporatisation.
If new forest corporations are forced to fill their positions with displaced
forest service employees, like DOC, then the corporations may lack the
management expertise needed to run an efficient business. If the new
corporations are not subject to civil service requirements, then reformers
must consider the cost to the government of terminating all of its em-
ployment obligations.
Without a well-managed transition, the state-owned corporations
may never build a firm business foundation. Because financially troubled
corporations may be forced to sell off assets to survive, a policy of
corporatisation might easily turn into a transfer of public assets to the
private sector. 18 5
C. Accountability
Corporatisation can be viewed as a reform designed to clarify ac-
countability. Shareholders hold private corporations accountable to pro-
vide an adequate return on their investments. However, state-owned
enterprises, because their assets are still under public ownership, do not
have such a clear line of accountability. 1 6 The New Zealand experience
shows that if shareholders are politicians, or appointed by politicians,
they may intervene in the corporation's business affairs to achieve polit-
ical objectives. Some critics charge that the ministerial shareholders of
Forestry Corporation are applying too much pressure for immediate
profitability to reduce the government's deficit. 87 Others charge that the
ministers are ignoring the economic well-being of local communities in
favor of environmental concerns. The Public Corporations Board, which
Teeguarden and Thomas propose, would add another layer of political
185. Recent economic pressures have forced many U.S. timber companies with decades of
business experience to liquidate assets in takeovers. The pressure is particularly acute in the
Northeast where the value of private forests has risen rapidly. Anderberg, Wall Street and the
Great North Woods, AMicus J., Winter 1989, at 40; Blackmer, Whose Woods Are These...
The Future of New England's Forests, ENVTL. FORUM, Nov.-Dec. 1988, at 19; They Cut Red-
woods Faster to Cut the Debt Faster, N. Y. Times, Mar. 2, 1988, at A16, col. 1; Where Have All
the Forests Gone?, N.Y. Times, Feb. 15, 1989, at A16, col. 4.
186. For instance, the public, which owns the SOE, may have limited rights of access to
information. See supra notes 94-101 and accompanying text.
187. See supra note 81 and accompanying text.
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accountability to this picture. '8 8 The interest groups on such a board can
be expected to engage in the same political rent seeking that has been
attributed to factions on public utility boards. 189 Finally, one must ques-
tion how concerned an SOE will be about investors so long as the govern-
ment stands in the wings to rescue the corporation should it face
insolvency. 190
Decreasing public involvement in forest management will necessi-
tate a reexamination of forestry regulation in the United States. Forest
practice laws, where they exist, vary considerably from state to state. If
these state rules do not apply to federally owned corporations, Congress
may need to pass a federal timber practice act. Certainly, the Endan-
gered Species Act' 9 ' would continue to apply to the forest corporations,
but new laws may be needed to protect other resources on federal
lands. 192 The natural area protection debate would shift from the propri-
etary management authority to the sovereign regulatory power of the
federal and state governments.
In New Zealand, DOC's mandate was designed to make the agency
more accountable for conservation values than NZFS had been.
Although the design was successful in the sense that DOC cannot implic-
itly sacrifice conservation values for logging the way that NZFS did, the
mixed nature of DOC's land management objectives still demands some
balancing of competing uses. 193 The New Zealand Treasury's require-
ment that DOC earn revenue from its lands and services means that pres-
ervation may still be rejected in favor of more immediately lucrative
uses. 194 Furthermore, by excluding the most productive forest land and
activity (logging) from DOC's purview, corporatisation has foreclosed a
strategy of using revenues from logging to pay for preserving an even
larger land area. If a conservation agency is to fund its own programs, it
188. Teeguarden & Thomas, supra note 2, at 375-76; see supra notes 28, 32-33 and accom-
panying text.
189. "While the financial objective of the corporation would not necessarily be to maxi-
mize profit, there would be a requirement to manage the corporate assets so as to earn at least
a public utility level rate-of-return." Teeguarden & Thomas, supra note 2, at 383.
190. See generally P. McKINLAY, supra note 64, at 75 (noting that the government wants
the SOE's to have normal corporate channels of accountability). O'Toole would permit forest
corporations to go bankrupt. Bankrupt corporate assets would then be sold to adjacent forest
corporations or wilderness trusts. In the event there were no bidders, the government would
manage the forests on a custodial basis. R. O'TOOLE, supra note 2, at 215. In the U.S. propos-
als, several forest companies would be created. The number of companies and their small
relative size would mitigate the consequences of a bankruptcy. On the other hand, the inabil-
ity of smaller companies to cross-subsidize operations in less productive areas might increase
the likelihood of a bankruptcy.
191.. 16 U.S'C. §§ 1531-1543 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986).
192. O'Toole believes that some strengthening of the Endangered Species Act may be
needed. R. O'TOOLE, supra note 2, at 210.
193. The corporate plan, which spells out performance objectives, is an attempt to make
the tradeoffs clear. See supra notes 105-09 and accompanying text.
194. See supra notes 110-13 and accompanying text.
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should be allowed to retain and use some productive lands. 195 O'Toole's
proposal for wilderness trusts would be funded by recovering costs from
recreation, grazing, and mining uses. 196 The New Zealand experience
teaches that commercially productive lands must be allocated to these
trusts so that they can generate enough revenue for preservation
management.
Effective institutional reform requires more than a change in man-
date. New Zealand erred when it relied heavily on a traditional, central-
ized bureaucracy as an organizing principle for DOC; as a result, the
agency operates inefficiently and has exceeded its budget, leading to in-
creased pressure to favor uses that generate revenue. 197 The administra-
tive organization of forestry corporations or wilderness trusts in the
United States should not adopt the bureaucratic structures of USFS
without a careful examination of those structures' potential problems. 198
V
CONCLUSION
In an atmosphere of rapid, ongoing reform of the entire state sector
and of natural resource laws, it is difficult to predict the future of forest
management in New Zealand. Corporatisation is stalled; the breakdown
of asset sale negotiation has the Government pushing for private manage-
ment for the duration of timber leases on public forests. However, it is
possible to apply the lessons of implementation to similar calls for reform
in the United States. The proposals that have been made for corporatisa-
tion of forest management in the United States are sketchy at best.
Before plunging into such schemes, difficult issues must be resolved con-
cerning the initial allocation of resources, management during the transi-
tion, and public accountability. The resolution of these issues will be
pivotal for corporatisation to achieve its economic and environmental
goals.
The difficult conflicts between competing forest land uses that face
USFS will not disappear with the creation of public forest corporations.
Instead, the stakes for preservation or production in forests will rise as it
becomes more difficult to reverse the land and resource allocation deci-
sions implementing corporatisation.
195. A recreation agency could eliminate cross-subsidies by requiring users to pay their
own way. However, a conservation agency directed to preserve nature must be supported by
subsidies from other users or a budget appropriation.
196. R. O'TOOLE, supra note 2, at 216.
197. See supra notes 112-15 and accompanying text.
198. Although originally designed to make decentralized management decisions, USFS
has become more of a centralized bureaucracy in recent years due to the planning process and
the additional power assumed by political appointees at the Department of Agriculture. Wil-
kinson, supra note 8, at 28.
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The New Zealand Labour Government first created Forestry Corpo-
ration, then announced its intention to sell the state-owned enterprise,199
and now proposes to lease forests to private companies. DOC's continu-
ing fiscal woes raise the possibility that it, too, will not long survive. 2°°
Thus, the ultimate.lesson of New Zealand's corporatisation experience
may be that corporatisation is not a stable institutional arrangement, but
merely a step along the road to full "privatisation."
199. Multi-Billion Dollar Price Tag on Offerings, The New Zealand Herald, July 29, 1988;
Budget Speech by R. Douglas, Minister of Finance to House of Representatives (July 28,
1988); Office of the Minister for State-Owned Enterprises, Press Statement (March 31, 1988).
200. Government Departments Say How They'll Cope, The Evening Post (Wellington), July
29, 1988, at 8, col. 7. In 1988-89, DOC will sell vehicles, land, buildings, and lay off wage
workers to meet a budget cut resulting from overspending during the last fiscal year. See supra
note 112 and accompanying text. Further, statutory reform focusing on resource utilization
may fragment an already-splintered DOC. The Department has been heavily criticized by
industry, for opposing development and meddling in industry's affairs, and by environmental-
ists, for not being sufficiently vigilant in preservation efforts. Some critics from both sides
suggest that DOC land might be better managed through a wilderness trust. For an example
of such a trust, see R. O'TOOLE, supra 2, at 216.
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